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THE PROBLEM WITH BILSKI: MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC 
PATENT CLAIMS REVEAL WEAKNESSES IN A NARROW 
SUBJECT MATTER TEST 
ANGELA D. FOLLETT* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution grants Congress broad power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”1 This grant created the U.S. Patent System, subsequently 
codified in Title 35 of the United States Code.2 Courts consider compliance 
with 35 U.S.C. § 101, the patentability and utility requirement, to be a 
threshold requirement to the grant of a patent.  
35 U.S.C. § 101 states: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor [sic], subject 
to the conditions and requirements of this title.”3 The first clause of this 
section provides a preliminary bar to patentability, while the second 
requires compliance with other sections of the title, namely §§ 102, 103, 
and 112, that provide detailed standards for patentability.4 The inquiry 
under § 101 is, however, not trivial; while it is considered by some to be “a 
threshold inquiry,” any patent which fails to meet the requirements of this 
section will be rejected regardless of whether or not it meets the other 
 
 *  Gustavus Adolphus College, BA 2001, University of Minnesota, PhD 2006, University of 
St. Thomas, JD Candidate 2011. The author would like to thank Dean Thomas Berg for his help in 
directing the scope and preparation of this article. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. 35 U.S.C. (2006). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 4. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2006). Section 102 requires an invention to be novel, or, 
in other words, it must be new (i.e., neither patented nor published in the United States or a 
foreign country). 35 U.S.C. § 102. Section 103 renders an invention obvious if “the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter 
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. Section 112 places 
requirements on the description of an invention, requiring “a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms 
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
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requirements of the code.5 Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit6 
have struggled to define a clear and concise test for assessing patentability 
under this section.7 
The Federal Circuit’s decision of In re Bilski highlights one aspect of 
this struggle: namely, defining the metes and bounds of the word “process” 
within § 101.8 The statute defines a “process” in 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) as a 
“process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”9 When § 101 
was originally drafted in the Patent Act of 1793, Thomas Jefferson defined 
statutory subject matter to include “any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement 
[thereof].”10 The statutory language remained unchanged until the Patent 
Act of 1952 when Congress implemented the word “process” in place of 
“art.”11 Accompanying this change, the Committee Reports indicate 
“Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the 
sun that is made by man.’”12 
Regardless of Congress’ broad intentions for statutory patentability, as 
a general principle, the Supreme Court has found that natural principles, 
mental thoughts and ideas, and abstract concepts are not patentable, in part, 
because these concepts form the basic tools of scientific research.13 Using 
this principle as a guide, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 
have decided a series of cases attempting to hone a definition for a 
patentable “process” and determine its function in deciphering which 
inventions are, in fact, patentable under § 101 and which are not. Prior to 
the decision in Bilski, § 101 functioned primarily as a low-bar threshold to 
patentability, represented, in part, by the standard provided in State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.14 This standard 
interpreted the requirements of § 101 broadly, requiring only that a 
 
 5. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 6. Patent cases, unlike most other federal cases, have all appeals heard at a singular 
appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Filing of patent suits may occur in 
any regional district court, but the appeal is always heard at the Federal Circuit and not in the 
regional circuit court. 
 7. Rajendra K. Bera, Patentable Subject Matter Under the US Patent Act, 1952: Cases, 95 
CURRENT SCI. 1421, 1421 (2008). 
 8. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006). Part of the difficulty associated with interpreting this 
particular word in the statute may be attributed to the use of the word in its own definition. 
 10. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting the Act of Feb. 21, 1973, § 
1, 1 Stat. 319). 
 11. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 14. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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patentable process produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”15 For 
more than ten years, this broad standard governed application of § 101. 
Bilski changed all that by implementing a definitive test that does not focus 
on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, but instead required 
that a patentable process either (1) ties to a particular machine or apparatus, 
or (2) transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.16 With a 
singular decision, the Federal Circuit changed the scope and standards of a 
patentable process under § 101. 
This imposed requirement for a process patent—the “machine-or-
transformation” test—has presented many questions regarding its 
application, particularly to areas of patent law outside the business method 
claims that framed the case. This article explores the jurisprudence leading 
up to the Federal Circuit decision in Bilski and the ramifications of applying 
the resulting “machine-or-transformation” test to biotechnology and 
medical diagnostic claims. Application of the Bilski test to this class of 
claims illustrates the underlying difficulty of crafting a rigid test to 
determine the patentability of process patents under § 101 that can be 
applied to the broad range of technologies seeking patent protection. The 
Supreme Court, in its de novo review of Bilski, should articulate a broad 
threshold standard for 35 U.S.C. § 101, removing the rigid bar to 
patentability set by the Federal Circuit and returning to a standard that is 
consistent with precedent and the statute’s original legislative design. Such 
a move would alleviate many of the problems associated with Bilski; for 
example, the broad sweeping effect it imposes on biotechnology processes 
and medical diagnostic claims through the ill-defined requirement of a tie to 
a particular machine or transformation. 
Part I of this paper introduces the major problem with the Bilski 
decision, namely its misreading of and departure from precedent in the 
creation of the “machine-or-transformation” test. Part II discusses the 
decision in Bilski, including the Federal Circuit’s purported rationale behind 
its implementation of the “machine-or-transformation” requirement. Part III 
extends the application of this new standard to medical diagnostic claims; 
specifically, comparing the decision in Classen v. Biogen17 to Prometheus 
v. Mayo.18 Finally, Part IV presents public policy considerations and 
proposed changes to the patentable subject matter analysis that the Supreme 
Court should consider as it determines the scope and reach of the “machine-
or-transformation” test. 
 
 15. Id. at 1374, 1377. 
 16. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 17. Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 18. Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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I. THE ROAD TO BILSKI 
The Federal Circuit justified its narrow “machine-or-transformation” 
test by misreading and misapplying a series of cases decided by the 
Supreme Court. Although the Bilski court claims to conjure support for its 
new test within these prior decisions, these cases are better read as 
articulating a clear and wide-ranging standard of review that maintains the 
broad and embracing character of § 101 intended by Congress. Prior to 
Bilski, process patents that avoided the narrow delineated group of 
disallowed subject matter (i.e., natural principles, mental thoughts and 
ideas, and abstract concepts19) could successfully pass over § 101’s 
threshold bar of patentability and test their invention against the remaining 
sections of Title 35.20 In her dissent to Bilski, Judge Newman summed up 
well the fundamental problems with the “machine-or-transformation” test: 
“[t]his exclusion of process inventions is contrary to statute, contrary to 
precedent, and a negation of the constitutional mandate. Its impact on the 
future, as well as on the thousands of patents already granted, is 
unknown.”21 
When statutory interpretation is involved, stare decisis is generally 
given considerable weight because, unlike constitutional interpretation, the 
court must analyze and critique the work of the legislative branch.22 In the 
case of § 101, in particular, Congress has not modified the statute in over 20 
years, making stare decisis all the more significant.23 According to Judge 
Newman, “[t]he only announced support for today’s change appears to be 
the strained new reading of Supreme Court quotations. But this court has 
previously read these decades-old opinions differently, without objection by 
either Congress or the Court. My colleagues do not state a reason for their 
change of heart.”24 As an example of what Judge Newman termed “strained 
new readings,” the Federal Circuit claims the Supreme Court first 
articulated its dispositive “machine-or-transformation” test in Gottschalk v. 
Benson.25 Although the Benson court did provide that the “machine-or-
transformation” test is a clue to the patentability of a process invention, 
what the Federal Circuit chose to gloss over was the Court’s clarification 
that while 
[i]t is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials 
 
 19. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 20. M.J. Edwards & Donald Steinberg, The Implications of Bilski: Patentable Subject Matter 
in the United States, 49 IDEA 411, 414 (2009). 
 21. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. at 993. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). 
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to a ‘different state or thing[,]’ [w]e do not hold that no process 
patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our 
prior precedents.26 
The Supreme Court made similar qualifications in its later decisions in 
Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr.27 The Federal Circuit, however, 
disregarded these statements just as they did in Benson, stretching the 
records to support its decision.  
The Bilski decision fundamentally altered § 101, moving away from a 
wide and embracing threshold standard toward a rigid bar to patentability. 
Imposition of the Bilski exclusion to patentability occurs before 
examination of an invention on its merits—in other words, before finding 
the invention to be novel, non-obvious, enabled, described, or particularly 
claimed.28 Prior to this decision, compliance with § 101 required little more 
than general subject matter eligibility; it had never been truly considered an 
independent condition of patentability.29 Such a change in the status quo of 
statutory patentability will undoubtedly have unpredictable implications on 
patents issued under the old standard, applications currently pending in the 
Patent and Trademark Office, and on inventions not yet conceived.  
In the discussion that follows, the Court’s reluctance to place a rigid bar 
to patentability under § 101 is clearly illustrated through the progression of 
the Benson, Flook, and Diehr decisions. These cases combine to articulate a 
clear and wide-ranging standard of review, which the State Street Bank 
“useful, concrete and tangible result” test expressed.30 While this test is far 
from perfect, it maintained the broad and embracing character of § 101 
intended by Congress and defined by precedent. The clarity afforded by this 
broad standard provided the statute with the flexibility to embrace not only 
current technology, but also innovations not yet achieved. Such clarity, and 
its accompanying stability, however, was lost when the decision of In re 
Bilski came down. Biotechnology patents particularly feel this loss, and the 
confines of a “machine-or-transformation” test place unreasonable limits on 
the potential for advancement that this technology area holds.   
In its review of Bilski, the Supreme Court must return the analysis 
under § 101 to “[a] straightforward, efficient, and ultimately fair approach 
to the evaluation of ‘new and useful’ processes—quoting Section 101—
[that recognizes] that a process invention that is not clearly a ‘fundamental 
truth, law of nature, or abstract idea’ is eligible for examination for 
 
 26. Id. at 71. 
 27. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 
(1981). 
 28. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 977 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90). 
 30. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
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patentability.”31 
A. Gottschalk v. Benson: Defining What Is Not a Process Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 
Gottschalk v. Benson is the first in a series of cases leading up to Bilski, 
which, when taken together, culminate in an expansive standard for 
patentability under § 101. Running through these decisions is a theme of 
broad inclusion and a resistance to a rigid bar to patentability. Benson 
established the general standard that one may not patent a natural principle 
(e.g., a formulation or mathematical algorithm) per se.32 The Court held that 
claims directed to a formula for converting binary-coded decimal numbers 
into pure binary numbers represented an unpatentable process within the 
meaning of the statute.33 In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the 
mathematical formula that formed the crux of the claims had little practical 
application beyond its claimed use in a digital computer34 and allowing a 
claim to the formula would preempt its only practical use and would in 
effect be a patent to the algorithm itself.35  
In discussing the scope of a patentable process under §101, the Court 
highlighted that in some cases, a patentable process will require a direct 
connection between the process and the instrumentalities of its 
implementation.36  
Such a link, however, is not the sole distinction of a patentable process. 
A natural process, for example, may be patentable if the basis of the 
invention is “the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”37 
This “new and useful end” need not necessarily be limited to tying the 
process to a particular machine. Instead, the process claim can stake its 
patentability on the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a 
different state or thing.’”38 Transformation of the article serves as “the clue 
to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.”39 Although initially this review of prior decisions may appear to 
lay the groundwork for a rigid test of patentability under § 101, the Court 
clarified by stating that  
[i]t is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials 
to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent 
 
 31. Id. at 997. 
 32. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 71–72. 
 36. Id. at 69–70. 
 37. Id. at 67 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 38. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70. 
 39. Id. at 70. 
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could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents.40 
Scholars have deciphered the discussion of processes in Benson as an 
effort by the Court to avoid articulating a test of patentability or a definition 
of a “process,” and instead to provide various factors that lead to finding a 
particular process unpatentable.41 Such factors include: broad claims that 
preempt alternative uses of an algorithm, claims which do not result in a 
new and useful end product from the application of an algorithm, claims 
which are not directly linked to a particular machine, and claims which do 
not transform a particular article to a different state or thing.42 The holding 
in Benson is an indication of the Court’s hesitancy to delineate a precise test 
for a process and, as such, the Court provides neither an authoritative 
definition of the term process nor a bright-line standard for its review. 
Instead, the Court describes inventions that fall outside the meaning of 
“process,” making it possible to interpret the term broadly. 
B. Beginning to Raise the Bar: Incorporating Novelty and Obviousness into 
§ 101 
The Court addressed the issue of algorithm patentability again six years 
later in its decision in Parker v. Flook, holding that a method for updating 
alarm limits, which implemented a mathematical formula for computing 
those limits, was unpatentable under § 101.43 Conventional methods of 
altering alarm limits and the disputed claims differed solely in the 
application of a “new and presumably better method for calculating alarm 
limit values” (i.e., the mathematical formula employed in the method’s 
second step).44 Applying Benson, the Court held the claims unpatentable 
because, although the algorithm was new, the process of adjusting alarm 
limits was not; the claims, therefore, were “directed essentially to a method 
of calculating, using a mathematical formula.”45  
The respondent argued that Benson should not apply in this case 
because the method claims do not “wholly preempt the mathematical 
formula.”46 The claims were directed to a process within the realm of the 
 
 40. Id. at 71. 
 41. “Thus, in Benson, the Supreme Court articulated various factors that could lead to the 
conclusion that the method claims were unpatentable: the claims were so broad that they would 
preempt the algorithm itself, the claims did not result in the application of the algorithm to a new 
and useful result, the claims did not transform a particular article to a different state or thing, and 
the claims were not tied to a particular machine or apparatus.” Edwards & Steinberg, supra note 
20, at 414. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 44. Id. at 588, 594–95. 
 45. Id. at 594–95. 
 46. Id. at 589–90. 
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petrochemical and oil-refining industries, consequently leaving open 
alternative applications of the formula within the public domain.47 
Moreover, according to the respondent, the latter step of the process—
adjusting the alarm limit based on the value computed by the formulation—
presented “post-solution” activity that distinguished the case from Benson. 
The Court disagreed, stating that “[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no 
matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”48 A claim 
that is “directed essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical 
formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose” is unpatentable under 
§ 101.49 
Although the majority maintained a broad standard for § 101 analysis, 
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, argued that the majority expanded the 
restriction against patenting mathematical formulas and had, in fact, struck 
a “damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by importing into its 
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness.”50 
The issue in this case was whether the patentability of a claimed process is 
preempted if one step in the process “would not be patentable subject matter 
if considered in isolation.”51 He stated that “[s]ection 101 is concerned only 
with subject-matter patentability. Whether a patent will actually issue 
depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 103, which include novelty and 
inventiveness, among many others.”52 The dissent illustrates that in 
broadening the stringent exemptions to the statutory requirements of § 
101,53 the Court imported standards into the statutory definition of a 
patentable process already covered by other sections of the Code. Such a 
step begins to narrow the standard previously upheld by the Court, but this 
move does not endure. 
C. Diehr: An Uncceptable Use of Otherwise Unpatentable Subject Matter 
In the decision of Diamond v. Diehr, the Court refined its holdings in 
Benson and Flook regarding the patentability of claims having 
mathematical formulas.54 The claims involved a method of curing synthetic 
rubber, which included continually measuring the temperature within the 
curing press, a step the industry had not previously been able to accomplish, 
and applying a well-known equation (the Arrhenius equation) to calculate 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 590. 
 49. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595. 
 50. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 599. 
 52. Id. at 600. 
 53. For example: natural principles and mathematical formulas, mental thoughts and ideas, 
and abstract concepts. 
 54. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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an exact cure time for the rubber. The Court found the claims patentable, 
regardless of the fact that they included a well-known mathematical 
formula.55 In reconciling the instant claims with those in Benson and Flook, 
the Court argued that the claims  
do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead they seek 
patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their 
process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, 
but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, 
they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in 
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.56 
In this case, the claims were found to involve the “transformation of an 
article,” and therefore the physical and chemical changes required for 
synthetic rubber molding placed the invention within the bounds of 
patentable subject matter under § 101.57  
In deciding Diehr, the Court refined and reiterated its earlier holdings 
by providing that a process claim that uses a mathematical formula is not 
automatically rendered unpatentable by such inclusion.58 A claim will only 
fail the standards of § 101 when the claim seeks to cover the mathematical 
formula per se—unpatentability of this type “cannot be circumvented by 
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological 
environment.”59 Claims implementing a mathematical formula are 
patentable under § 101 when, “considered as a whole, [the invention is] 
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., 
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing).”60 
Examination of claims solely to determine compliance with statutory 
subject matter effectively eliminated the incorporation of novelty into § 101 
introduced by Flook and reintroduced the broad and inclusive scope into § 
101 analysis.61  
Through this decision, and in response to the dissent in Flook, the Court 
lowered the threshold of § 101 and, in applying the transformation test of 
Benson, allowed for the acceptance of natural laws, or mathematical 
formulas, as statutory subject matter. Reflecting Diehr’s broad 
interpretation of § 101, the Federal Circuit created a standard for review in 
State Street Bank Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. that defined 
patentable processes for over ten years.62 
 
 55. Id. at 177–78, 191. 
 56. Id. at 187. 
 57. Id. at 184. 
 58. Id. at 187. 
 59. Id. at 191 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)). 
 60. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. 
 61. Id. at 188–90. 
 62. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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D. A Utility Standard for § 101 
The Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc. in 1998, and its holding formed the backbone of § 
101 analysis for process claims up until the decision in Bilski.63 The claims 
at issue in State Street involved a system for monitoring and recording 
financial information flow; specifically, the system made all of the 
necessary calculations for maintaining a partner fund financial services 
configuration.64 The nature of the business required quick and accurate 
performance of the calculations and, given their complexity, a computer 
was essentially required to accomplish the task.65 The lower court had held 
that the claimed invention “fell into one of two alternative judicially created 
exceptions to statutory subject matter:” the “mathematical algorithm” 
exception or the “business method” exception.66 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit focused on the broad nature of § 101 and 
the distinctiveness of this particular section compared to those focused on 
the patentability of a claimed invention—namely §§ 102, 103, and 112.67 
Specifically, the court examined the construction of § 101, stating that 
“[t]he plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention falling 
within one of the four stated categories of statutory subject matter [i.e., any 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter] may be patented, 
provided it meets the other requirements for patentability set forth in Title 
35, i.e., those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112, ¶ 2.”68 Congress’s repetitive 
use of the term “any” throughout § 101 provides textual evidence to support 
this broad interpretation, which the court relied upon in prohibiting 
additional restrictions on patentable subject matter.  
Accordingly, the court held that although a mathematical algorithm, 
calculation, or formula, being an abstract idea, is not, by itself, patentable, 
this deficiency can be overcome if, in fact, the algorithm produces “a 
useful, concrete and tangible result.”69 The holding moved the focus of 
finding statutory patentable subject matter from determining whether a 
strict physical transformation of the data occurred to determining whether 
the transformation of the data was, in fact, “useful.”70 The court further 
clarified its position on § 101 and proposed a move away from strict 
construction toward a broad utility requirement: “[t]he question of whether 
a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1371. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1377. 
 68. State St., 149 F.3d at 1372. 
 69. Id. at 1373–74. 
 70. Id. at 1374. 
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the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to—process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter [although it must, 
obviously, fall into one of them]—but rather on the essential characteristics 
of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”71 Under this 
standard, the court found it unnecessary to classify the claims under either 
the “mathematical algorithm” or “business method” exception articulated 
by the lower court.72 The “useful, concrete and tangible result” standard for 
§ 101 and its focus on utility was significantly narrowed and refocused by 
the decision in Bilski. 
Critics have chastised the State Street standard for permitting claims to 
inventions that do not involve technology per se: for example, financial 
methods, arbitration methods, teaching methods, and even methods for 
simple routines such as swinging on a playground swing.73 In spite of this 
criticism, the decision in State Street provided a test for patentability that 
applied as well to the business method claims as it did to biotechnology and 
medical diagnostic claims. This broad standard properly placed the crux of 
an invention’s patentability on its merits, namely novelty and 
nonobviousness. In biotechnology, where an innovation may not rely on the 
use of a particular machine or the transformation of an article, a broad 
standard facilitates patentability. The bulk of patentability may instead 
focus on the novelty and nonobviousness of the innovation and not on 
compliance with a narrow standard written with only a business method in 
mind. The decision in In re Bilski, especially when viewed from the 
perspective of biotechnology and medical diagnostics, compounded the 
weaknesses of State Street while simultaneously taking away its strengths. 
II. BILSKI AND THE “MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION” TEST 
In deciding In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit eliminated over ten years of 
relative stability in the jurisprudence surrounding § 101 analysis when it 
overruled its previous decision in State Street, replacing the “useful, 
concrete and tangible result” test with its newly minted “machine-or-
transformation” test.74 Under the “machine-or-transformation” test, “[a] 
claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into 
a different state or thing.”75 
The test arose from the analysis of Bilski’s patent claiming “[a] method 
for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a 
 
 71. Id. at 1375 (citation omitted). 
 72. Id. at 1374, 1377. 
 73. Lilly He, In re Bilski En Banc Rehearing on Patentable Subject Matter: Farewell to 
Business Method Patents?, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 254 (2008). 
 74. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–961 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 75. Id. at 954. 
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commodity provider at a fixed price.”76 The court explained the nature of 
the invention through the following example. 
[C]oal power plants (i.e., the “consumers”) purchase coal to 
produce electricity and are averse to the risk of a spike in demand 
for coal since such a spike would increase the price and their costs. 
Conversely, coal mining companies (i.e., the “market participants”) 
are averse to the risk of a sudden drop in demand for coal since 
such a drop would reduce their sales and depress prices. The 
claimed method envisions an intermediary, the “commodity 
provider,” that sells coal to the power plants at a fixed price, thus 
isolating the power plants from the possibility of a spike in demand 
increasing the price of coal above the fixed price. The same 
provider buys coal from mining companies at a second fixed price, 
thereby isolating the mining companies from the possibility that a 
drop in demand would lower prices below that fixed price. And the 
provider has thus hedged its risk; if demand and prices skyrocket, it 
has sold coal at a disadvantageous price but has bought coal at an 
advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and prices fall.77 
The claim does not recite how the method is to be implemented and is 
not tied to the use of a computer;78 in fact, “[n]o hardware is required to 
perform the method, although performing the steps on a machine would 
infringe.”79 In addition, the claim is not limited by a particular type of 
commodity80—it is not even tied expressly or impliedly to any physical 
subject matter, tangible or intangible.81 These factors, and the application of 
the “machine-or-transformation” test, led the court to affirm the decision of 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and find the claims 
unpatentable.82 
A.  The Majority’s “Machine-or-Transformation” Test 
The court framed the issue in Bilski as a question of whether 
Applicant’s claims were drawn to a fundamental principle and, if so, 
whether the claims, if allowed, would effectively preempt all uses of that 
fundamental principle.83 In answering these questions, the court concluded 
that § 101 requires a claim to be limited to particular applications of a 
fundamental principle, and therefore renders unpatentable any claim to a 
 
 76. Id. at 949. 
 77. Id. at 949–50. 
 78. Id. at 950. 
 79. Benjamin J. McEniery, The Federal Circuit in Bilski: The Machine-or-Transformation 
Test, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 253, 254 (2009). 
 80. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 949. 
 83. Id. at 952. 
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fundamental principle itself.84 To reach this conclusion, the court disavowed 
the long-standing “useful, concrete and tangible result test,” finding its 
application potentially useful as an indicator of patentability, but wholly 
insufficient to ensure the limitations required under the statute.85 
In reframing an analysis of statutory subject matter, the majority in 
Bilski attempted to rely solely on an application of existing Supreme Court 
precedent. In particular, the court relied heavily on many of the decisions 
discussed supra—namely, Gottschalk v. Benson, Diamond v. Diehr and 
Parker v. Flook. In interpreting these cases, the majority determined that the 
Supreme Court had laid down a definitive test for process patentability,86 
stating “the proper inquiry under § 101 is not whether the process claim 
recites sufficient ‘physical steps,’ but rather whether the claim meets the 
“machine-or-transformation” test.”87 
As stated above, the “machine-or-transformation” test requires a 
claimed process to be either (1) directly tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or (2) involve the transformation of a particular article into a 
different state or thing.88 In addition, the court articulated two corollaries to 
the test.89 First, field-of-use limitations, those which would limit the claim 
to a particular use or purpose, are not sufficient to supply patentability to an 
otherwise unpatentable process.90 Second, the involvement of a machine or 
transformation to the claimed process must provide meaningful limitations 
to the claim and amount to more than “insignificant postsolution activity.”91 
The majority provided limited guidance on the test’s application. With 
regard to the machine prong of the test in particular, the court did little to 
explain its application and scope as the language of the Bilski claims were 
not limited to a particular machine or apparatus.92 The court, therefore, felt 
it was appropriate to “leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise 
contours of machine implementation, as well as . . . whether or when 
recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular 
machine.”93  
 
 84. Id. at 954 (“A claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a particular 
machine or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not also use the specified 
machine or apparatus in the manner claimed. And a claimed process that transforms a particular 
article to a specified different state or thing by applying a fundamental principle would not pre-
empt the use of the principle to transform any other article, to transform the same article but in a 
manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything other than transform the specified article.”).  
 85. Id. at 959. 
 86. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954. 
 87. Id. at 961. 
 88. Id. at 954. 
 89. Id. at 957.  
 90. Id. at 957, 961. 
 91. Id. at 957, 962. 
 92. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. 
 93. Id. 
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The decision in Bilski focused instead on the second prong of the test, 
whether the claims included a transformation of an article to a different 
state or thing.94 In articulating the spectrum of patentable transformations, 
the court held at one end the “virtually self-evident” processes involving 
“chemical or physical transformation of physical objects or substances” as 
clearly eligible subject matter. At the other end of the spectrum, processes 
involving the transformation of electronic data representing abstract 
constructs or intangibles are ineligible.95 Recognizing the importance of 
inventions involving electronic transformations of data, the court clarified 
that while the addition of a data-gathering step is insufficient to render an 
algorithm patentable,96 “[s]o long as the claimed process is limited to a 
practical application of a fundamental principle to transform specific data, 
and the claim is limited to a visual depiction that represents specific 
physical objects or substances,” the claim is patentable and avoids the 
dangers of patenting a fundamental principle. 
B. Development of the “Machine-or-Transformation” Test  
The Federal Circuit claims that the “machine-or-transformation” test 
was born—albeit indirectly—out of the decision in Benson, where the 
Supreme Court stated the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a 
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that 
does not include particular machines.”97 The Court in Benson went on to 
articulate that compliance with the “machine-or-transformation” test was 
not the sole requirement for a patentable process:  
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials 
to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent 
could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents.98 
In Bilski, however, the Federal Circuit interpreted the Court’s 
application of the Benson test in Flook and Diehr to indicate the Supreme 
Court’s intention that the “machine-or-transformation” test become the 
requirement for all patentable processes under § 101.99 In addressing its 
reliance on the test in Benson, the Federal Circuit court stated: 
We believe that the Supreme Court spoke of the machine-or-
 
 94. Id. at 962. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 963 (“A requirement simply that data inputs be gathered—without specifying 
how—is a meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because every algorithm inherently 
requires the gathering of data inputs.”).  
 97. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). 
 98. Id. at 71. 
 99. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56. 
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transformation test as the “clue” to patent-eligibility because the 
test is the tool used to determine whether a claim is drawn to a 
statutory “process”—the statute does not itself explicitly mention 
machine implementation or transformation. We do not consider the 
word “clue” to indicate that the machine-or-implementation test is 
optional or merely advisory. Rather, the Court described it as the 
clue, not merely “a” clue.100 
The rationale discussed by the majority, and their apparent 
interpretation and application of precedent, was met with resistance. Judge 
Newman, as one example, argued in her dissent that the majority missed its 
target of framing a rule in reliance on Supreme Court precedent and instead 
clearly violated it.101 In particular, she focused on the clear statements of the 
Court emphasizing its desire to avoid an all-encompassing rule based, in 
part, on the broad nature of § 101. For example, Judge Newman quoted the 
Court in Flook, where it stated: 
The statutory definition of “process” is broad. An argument can be 
made, however, that this Court has only recognized a process as 
within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular 
apparatus or operated to change materials to a “different state or 
thing.” As in Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may 
issue even if it does not meet one of these qualifications of our 
earlier precedents.102 
Judge Newman argued that, in ignoring the initial statement “[a]n 
argument can be made” and the qualifying sentence that follows, the 
majority manipulated the precedential cases to create an all-encompassing 
test not envisioned by the Court.103 Referring to the majority’s justification 
explaining away the apparent equivocal nature of the Benson decision, she 
bluntly states, “there is nothing equivocal about ‘We do not so hold.’”104 
The majority, however, stood firm in its application of its version of 
Supreme Court precedent, with only one caveat: 
[W]e agree that future developments in technology and the sciences 
may present difficult challenges to the machine-or-transformation 
test, just as the widespread use of computers and the advent of the 
Internet has begun to challenge it in the past decade. Thus, we 
recognize that the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to alter or 
perhaps even set aside this test to accommodate emerging 
technologies. And we certainly do not rule out the possibility that 
this court may in the future refine or augment the test or how it is 
 
 100. Id. at 956 n.11. 
 101. Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 979 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978)). 
 103. Id. at 979 n.1, 980. 
 104. Id. at 979. 
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applied. At present, however, and certainly for the present case, we 
see no need for such a departure and reaffirm that the machine-or-
transformation test, properly applied, is the governing test for 
determining patent eligibility of a process under § 101.105 
This statement did away with all other constructions of § 101 and 
created in their stead a definitive test for patentability. 
C. The Test Applied to Bilski and Its Effect on the Stability of the Patent 
Process  
Caveats and exceptions aside, the “machine-and-transformation” test, as 
applied to the claims at issue in Bilski, resulted in an affirmation of the 
Board’s finding of unpatentability. The claimed process of hedging risk did 
not involve a transformation of a physical substance as required under the 
test.106 “Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or 
private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such 
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or 
substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or 
substances.”107 The majority declared that Bilski’s claims, if allowed, 
“would effectively pre-empt any application of the fundamental concept of 
hedging and mathematical calculations inherent in hedging (not even 
limited to any particular mathematical formula).”108 Given that the claims 
admittedly did not involve the application of a particular machine or 
apparatus, the claims failed the “machine-or-transformation” test and 
therefore did not qualify under the Federal Circuit’s newly-implemented 
bounds of § 101.109  
The “useful, concrete and tangible result” espoused in State Street was 
not without its flaws. Following the State Street decision, the Patent Office 
was overwhelmed with claims that did not involve technology, per se.110 
Instead, the applications, which met the standards of State Street, related to 
financial methods, arbitration methods, teaching methods, and even 
methods for simple routines such as swinging on a playground swing.111 In 
the years following State Street, the patent office and the courts worked to 
create confines for patentable processes and offer transparent guidelines.112 
This work provided strong motivation for the rigid Bilski standard. 
The decision in Bilski, however, left many open questions regarding the 
 
 105. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956. 
 106. Id. at 965. 
 107. Id. at 963–64. 
 108. Id. at 965–66. 
 109. Id. at 966. 
 110. He, supra note 73, at 254.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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impact of the “machine-or-transformation” requirement on future patents 
and those that were issued under the State Street standard. Judge Newman 
summarized it well when she stated in her dissent, “[i]ndeed, the full reach 
of today’s change of law is not clear . . . . Uncertainty is the enemy of 
innovation. These new uncertainties not only diminish the incentives 
available to new enterprise, but disrupt the settled expectations of those 
who relied on the law as it existed.”113 Scholars have contended that “the 
Federal Circuit succeeded in bringing an element of predictability to the 
jurisprudence of 35 U.S.C. § 101, [however,] it also placed a cloud of 
invalidity over a substantial number of issued method claims” which may 
not meet the narrow Bilski standard.114  
Claim 1 in U.S. Patent No. 7,514,221 (entitled, “Diagnostic Assay and 
Method of Treatment Involving Macrophage Inhibitory Cytokine-1 (MIC-
1)”) provides but one example of such a claim: 
1. A method of diagnosis of colonic cancer or rectal cancer 
characterized by an increased level of expression of MIC-1, said 
method comprising; 
(i) determining the amount of MIC-1 present in a body sample 
taken from a human test subject, 
(ii) comparing said determined amount against the amount, or range 
of amounts, of MIC-1 present in equivalent body sample(s) from 
normal subject(s), and 
(iii) diagnosing colonic cancer or rectal cancer when the amount of 
MIC-1 determined in step (i) is increased compared to said amount, 
or range of amounts, of MIC-1 present in equivalent body 
sample(s) from normal subject(s) and wherein said amount 
determined in step (i) is greater than 1050 pg/ml; wherein said body 
sample is a sample of blood serum or plasma.115 
This claim would presumptively fail to meet the requirements of the 
“machine-or-transformation” test. It is neither tied to a particular machine, 
nor, as will be discussed in more detail below, does the transformation 
described appear to meet the necessary requirements of the test.116 
Biotechnology is but one example of the far-reaching implications of 
the Bilski decision cautioned by Judge Newman. The following section of 
this paper will explore two recent decisions involving medical diagnostic 
claims—Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC117 and Prometheus 
 
 113. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 114. Eric D. Kirsch & Elizabeth Reilly, The Emperor Bilski’s Wearing No Clothes, in 2 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT LITIGATION 2009, at 71, 91–92 (2009). 
 115. Id. at 90. 
 116. Id. at 90–91. 
 117. Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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Laboratories, Inc., v. Mayo Collaborative Services118—and the inconsistent 
application of the “machine-or-transformation” test used to arrive at their 
ultimate holdings. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari to hear the 
Bilski case, and may provide yet another change to the statutory framework 
defined by § 101. The problems highlighted by the decisions in Classen and 
Prometheus illustrate the greater implications of defining statutory subject 
matter when it evaluates this “definitive” test. 
III. APPLYING THE “MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION” TEST TO MEDICAL 
DIAGNOSTIC CLAIMS  
Two medical diagnostic cases have been decided since the 
implementation of the Bilski “machine-or-transformation” test for statutory 
subject matter—Classen and Prometheus. The former was a non-binding, 
single-paragraph decision, while the other received full review and 
discussion by the Federal Circuit. These decisions provide only two 
examples of the inherent problems with the Bilski standard but together 
argue strongly for a thorough overhaul of the “machine-or-transformation” 
test by the Supreme Court. 
A. Immunizations Are Not Transformative 
The Federal Circuit declared the Classen claims invalid in a short and 
seemingly off-hand decision. As stated above, the opinion came down as a 
single paragraph stating, “In light of our decision in In re Bilski . . . we 
affirm . . . that these claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dr. Classen’s 
claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or apparatus’ nor do they 
‘transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.’”119 The 
claims at issue involved a method of determining an immunization 
schedule, and read: 
A method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects 
the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder in 
a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of 
mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in the treatment 
group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more 
immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and 
comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said 
chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such 
a disorder, in the treatment group, with that in the control group.120 
Prior to the decision in Bilski, the broad Classen claims may well have 
been found unpatentable based on the precedents already in front of the 
 
 118. Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 119. Classen, 304 Fed. App’x at 867. 
 120. U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283, claim 1 (filed Aug. 4, 1994). 
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court. Applying the preemption test in Benson and Flook, these sweeping 
claims improperly preempt all uses of the broad and basic comparison 
claimed.121 This determination follows from recognition that every other 
activity described in the claims, apart from the comparison of the two test 
groups, is no more than data gathering necessary to make the comparison. 
The Federal Circuit, however, in creating its definitive test in Bilski, has 
effectively rendered the preemption test meaningless by making its own test 
controlling. Admittedly, the Classen claims do not tie to a particular 
machine or apparatus, but the question of whether or not there is a 
transformation of an article to a different state or thing is less clear.  
Dr. Warren D. Woessner, an immunologist, for one, argues that the 
Federal Circuit’s simplistic dismissal of the claims in Classen was 
improper.122 He contends that the step of mammal immunization inherently 
involves the transformation of the mammal from “a nonimmune state to an 
immune state. More particularly, the process of immunization, also known 
as vaccination, involves the transformation of naïve immune cells into 
mature immune cells.”123 This process would appear to meet the 
requirements of a transformation under the Bilski standard.124  
Although this decision was non-precedential, it placed the application 
of the “machine-or-transformation” test in apparent flux. It begs the 
question: what is required for a patentable transformation under Bilski? 
Richard Sybert and David Heckadon have argued that the claims in Classen 
would have met the standard if the forefront of the claim included the 
inherent transformation; for example, the claim may have been more 
successful had it recited: “Physically transforming mammals into an 
immunized state by applying . . . .”125 The claims in Classen are 
representative of many types of diagnostic claims in their lack of 
 
 121. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). 
 122. Warren D. Woessner & Tania A. Shapiro-Barr, Federal Circuit Applies Bilski Standard 
in Classen, 9 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1 (Mar. 2009). 
 123. Id. (“When a mammal is vaccinated, a small amount of a ‘non-self’ antigen (or 
immunogen), typically derived from a disease-causing organism, is introduced into the mammal's 
system. Upon encountering the non-self antigen, naïve T cells (a type of immune cell) are 
transformed into mature T cells. Mature T cells either act directly to eliminate the non-self 
antigen, or they effect the transformation of naïve B cells (another type of immune cell) into active 
B cells. Active B cells produce antibodies that attack the non-self antigen. Once B cells and T 
cells have been activated, some are transformed into memory cells. Memory cells serve 
throughout the lifetime of the mammal as reserve forces ready to attack a previously encountered 
antigen. In this way, the immune response to a second and subsequent exposure to an antigen is 
faster and stronger, which is the purpose of immunization.”).  
 124. Id. 
 125. RICHARD SYBERT & DAVID HECKADON, THE IMPACT OF BILSKI ON BUSINESS METHOD 
PATENTS LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING PROCEDURAL CHANGES, FORMING NEW PATENT 
FILING STRATEGIES, AND FORECASTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 
IMPACT OF THE BILSKI DECISION AND ITS RECENT APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 11 (Aspatore 
ed., Aug. 2009), available at 2009 WL 2510889. 
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attachment to a particular type of machine.126 In addition, many types of 
diagnostic claims do not benefit from a transformation.127 The diagnostic 
method claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,514,221 discussed above are but one 
example of issued claims that, on their face, do not meet the standards set 
forth in Bilski. The lack of a clear rationale behind the court’s holding in 
Classen has left the fate of such claims under the “machine-or-
transformation” test unclear. 
B. An Apparently Patentable Transformation 
Prometheus v. Mayo presents an alternative interpretation of a 
patentable process involving a transformation under the Bilski test. The 
claims at issue in Prometheus involved a method of optimizing the 
therapeutic effect of 6-mercaptopurine (6-MP) and its prodrug, 
azathiopurine (AZA), to minimize toxic side effects.128 Claim 1 of U.S. 
Patent No. 6,355,623, which is representative of the asserted claims, reads: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject 
having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having 
said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 
8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of 
said drug subsequently administered to said subject and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 
8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of 
said drug subsequently administered to said subject.129 
The claims can be summarized as having three steps: (1) administer the 
drug; (2) determine the resulting metabolite levels; and (3) recognize that a 
dosage adjustment may be needed.130  
Similar to Bilski, the issue of this case was whether the claims 
preempted a fundamental principle or the application of a fundamental 
principle.131 Applying the “machine-or-transformation” test to the claims 
presented, the Federal Circuit decided, contrary to Classen, that “the 
methods of treatment claimed in the patents in suit squarely fall within the 
 
 126. Woessner & Shapiro-Barr, supra note 122. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 129. Id. at 1340. 
 130. Id. at 1341. 
 131. Id. at 1342. 
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realm of patentable subject matter because they ‘transform an article into a 
different state or thing,’ and this transformation is ‘central to the purpose of 
the claimed process.’”132  
The court went on to explain its holding by clarifying that “[t]he 
transformation is of the human body following administration of a drug and 
the various chemical and physical changes of the drug’s metabolites that 
enable their concentrations to be determined.”133 The fact that the 
transformation is facilitated entirely by the natural processes occurring 
within the body does not prevent the patentability of the method. Instead, 
by the courts rationale, the physical administration of an artificial substance 
(in this case, the drug) initiates the natural process, and the administration 
itself triggers the subsequent transformations.134 Allowance of these claims 
does not threaten the natural processes themselves because the claims do 
not preempt the processes; instead, the invention uses the body’s natural 
response in a series of well-defined steps with the goal of treating various 
diseases.135 According to the Federal Circuit, “[i]t is clear that these 
methods of treatment are § 101 patentable subject matter.”136 
C. A Fundamental Divergence 
The decision in Classen left much to be desired, but the Federal 
Circuit’s recent decision in Prometheus provided greater scrutiny of 
medical diagnostic claims. The inconsistent interpretation of a patentable 
transformation between these two decisions, however, afforded little clarity 
for future applications of Bilski to this particular subset of claims. In 
Prometheus, the court made a point of stating that “[t]he asserted claims are 
in effect claims to methods of treatment, which are always transformative 
when a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the 
effects of an undesired condition.”137 Comparison of the claims in Classen 
and Prometheus, however, leaves many questions about how their minimal 
differences could lead to such varied results. First, both Classen and 
Prometheus involved the physical administration of a foreign substance to a 
mammal; in the case of Classen, the substance was an immunogen, while in 
Prometheus, the substance was a therapeutic drug. Second, both substances 
initiated a series of natural processes within the mammal, which, under the 
standards set forth in Prometheus, should constitute a patentable 
transformation. Third, both sets of claims represent a “method of 
treatment.” The claims in Prometheus clearly classify themselves as such in 
 
 132. Id. at 1345 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 133. Id. at 1346. 
 134. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346–47. 
 135. Id. at 1347–49. 
 136. Id. at 1350. 
 137. Id. at 1346. 
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the preamble of the claim and further define the scope of the claim as 
preventing toxic side reactions related to administration of the drug;138 but it 
is hardly inconsistent to consider the prevention of chronic immune-
mediated disorders through immunization any less of a treatment method. 
As was suggested by one scholar following the Classen decision, 
perhaps the decision simply requires framing an invention using the right 
words.139 This concern has also been voiced with respect to the machine 
prong of the Federal Circuit’s test.140 In 2001, following the decision in 
Diamond v. Diehr, Cohen and Lemly identified a similar response to that 
decision as “the doctrine of the magic words.”141 These scholars claim that 
the patentability of software patents following the Diehr decision came to 
hinge on whether or not the patent applications and corresponding claims 
purported to patent something entirely different from software.142 In fact, 
“knowledgeable patent attorneys did exactly that, claiming software 
inventions as hardware devices, pizza ovens, and other ‘machines.’”143 
Similarly, medical diagnostic claims may need to be recast as “a method of 
treatment” or as “a process of transforming a mammal” to traverse the 
barrier created by Bilski. Skillful patent attorneys and agents will need to 
develop ways to make the abstract ideas appear to conform to the standards 
set by the “machine-or-transformation” test, but, as can be seen by the 
aftermath of Diehr, such has been accomplished before.144 
IV. A NEW REVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS FOR § 101 
The Bilski decision is not yet an irreversible standard upon which 
patentable subject matter under § 101 will be judged. On June 1st, 2009, the 
Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari in Bilski v. Doll.145 While the 
Court approved two issues for review, the remainder of this paper discusses 
the first issue:146 whether the Supreme Court’s historical avoidance of 
unnecessary limitations to the broad inclusiveness of § 101 renders the 
 
 138. The court relies on this fact in its argument stating that “[t]he invention’s purpose to treat 
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Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test inappropriate and 
inconsistent with precedent.147 Given the inherent problems with the 
“machine-or-transformation” test highlighted in its application to diagnostic 
method claims, for example, the Court must consider the implications of 
such a strict and narrow standard in deciding its fate. Should the Court 
decide to restate the standards upon which patentable subject matter is to be 
judged, it would be appropriate to rely not only upon its own jurisprudence, 
but to also consider policy implications, something the Federal Circuit 
failed to do. 
A. Public Policy: The Unconsidered Factor in Bilski 
In framing its decision as an application of existing Supreme Court 
precedent, the clear lack of any policy-based analysis in the Federal 
Circuit’s decision is apparent. The Federal Circuit grounds this practice in 
the belief that public policy considerations lie solely within the domain of 
the legislature and the Supreme Court.148 In fact, its reluctance to address or 
admit the patent policy created by its decisions has spurred scholars to 
argue that, specifically in the industries of biotechnology and software, “the 
Federal Circuit has gotten the policy precisely backwards, perhaps because 
it is not making industry-specific patent policy intentionally.”149 Ignoring 
the pressures and considerations of public and patent policy has moved the 
Federal Circuit, as is confirmed with its decision in Bilski, away from a 
flexible approach to one that revels in bright-line rules.150 The rules are 
often inconsistent and inappropriate with the technology-neutral design of 
statutory patent law.151 The Supreme Court, however, has not imposed such 
limitations and should consider the public policy behind decision of 
whether or not to grant particular patents. 
1. A Balance of Interests 
To discuss the public policy behind patenting, consideration must be 
given to the fact that the patent system was mandated by the U.S. 
Constitution to “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”152 To 
accomplish this goal, the patent system rewards the creative activity of 
authors and inventors through the provision of a limited monopoly balanced 
by requiring full public access to the innovation upon its expiration.153 Such 
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a balance is not struck freely, and  
[p]atent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as 
surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that 
underprotection can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to 
sail between these opposing and risky shoals is through rules that 
bring certain types of invention and discovery within the scope of 
patentability while excluding others.154 
Biotechnology, including medical diagnostics, clearly illustrates the 
tension between the inventor and the public good. On one side of the issue 
are the inventors and the biotech industry. Unlike other technology areas 
(for example, the software and financial services industries discussed 
directly in Bilski), “the biotech industry relies very heavily on its 
intellectual property for sustainability.”155 One explanation for this reliance 
is the amount of time and money required for the development and 
implementation of a new drug or diagnostic. The process of bringing a new 
drug to market can take, on average, a decade or more and cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars.156 Patents, and the monopoly afforded by them, provide 
incentive for the financial gamble taken by these innovators. If, however, 
the ability to obtain patents and guarantee the protection of their intellectual 
property is eliminated, “it will likely become more difficult for biotech 
companies to attract investors, which will in turn discourage invention and 
the advancement of science.”157 
The other side of the balancing scale holds researchers and the public. 
They argue that the monopoly afforded by patents offers control over 
innovation that results in more harm than good.158 As one example, the 
American Civil Liberties Union has gathered a group of plaintiffs 
composed of medical and scientific organizations, individual researchers 
and physicians, and cancer patients to challenge a series of patents held by 
Myriad Genetics.159 These patents are directed to the breast cancer 
susceptibility genes BRCA1 and BRCA2; as a result of these patents, 
research and diagnostic testing involving these genes require the approval 
of, and generally some payment to, Myriad.160 The complaint argues that 
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control over something as fundamental as genetic material prevents the 
progression of important scientific discoveries and significantly hinders the 
operation of doctors and their patients towards finding a cure.161 This case 
draws a picture of the less flattering side of the patent monopoly.  
The Myriad case is not the first time advances in biotechnology and 
medicine have been challenged on public policy grounds. As one example, 
when the Patent & Trademark Office issued the first patent to a surgical 
method, healthcare practitioners voiced their concerns about their ability to 
treat their patients without the threat of being sued for infringement.162 
Instead of excluding such methods from the category of statutory subject 
matter, however, Congress provided a new provision to the Patent Act163 
that “permitted health practitioners and health care facilities to engage in 
‘medical activity’ that infringed a patent without fear of being sued for 
infringement.”164 The nature of the claims in Myriad do not permit this 
provision to exempt medical practitioners from infringement, but this action 
by Congress provides one example of how the interests of both the 
inventors and the public can be served without placing unnecessary 
limitations on the grant of patents.  
Upholding the decision in Bilski may threaten the progress of science 
by hindering the ability of biotech companies to realize a return on their 
substantial investment. This industry “is developing critically important 
ways to diagnose and treat diseases and screen for compounds that often 
involve processes that could very well fail Bilski’s ‘matter or 
transformation’ test.”165 This begs the question of whether this is a cost that 
the public can afford. 
2. There Is Something to Be Said for Stability 
The decision in Bilski undid a period of relative stability in the 
jurisprudence surrounding patentable subject matter under § 101. As was 
discussed above, the “useful, concrete and tangible result” inquiry had 
provided the standard for review over the last decade and offered guidance 
for issued patents in a variety of technology areas. The implementation of 
the “machine-or-transformation” test ushered in an uncertainty not only to 
those patents not yet written, but more importantly, the decision has left the 
validity of many issued patents in doubt.166 The retroactive application of 
the Bilski test leaves this latter group without the ability to develop new 
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patent practices directed to drafting around the new requirements.167 Judge 
Newman brought this argument to the forefront in her dissent arguing: 
Unstable law is the enemy of innovation. These new uncertainties 
not only diminish the incentives available to new enterprise, but 
disrupt the settled expectations of those who relied on the law as it 
existed. . . I don’t know how much human creativity and 
commercial activity will be devalued by today’s change in law; but 
neither do my colleagues.168  
The Supreme Court needs to consider many aspects of patentability, 
both existent law and the framework needed to support the public policy 
requirements for patents. Judge Newman had the right idea when she 
argued that “[a] straightforward, efficient, and ultimately fair approach to 
the evaluation of ‘new and useful’ processes is to recognize that a process 
invention that is not clearly a ‘fundamental truth, law of nature, or abstract 
idea’ is eligible for examination for patentability.”169 This is the standard 
that framed the drafting of § 101 and remained untouched for nearly 200 
years; it should stay that way. 
B. Viable Alternatives 
The Supreme Court has many options to consider in redesigning the 
utility standard under § 101. First, the Court could revert to the “useful, 
concrete and tangible result” of State Street, but, as was discussed supra, the 
standard was not a perfect one. The Court must address the influx of 
business method patents, but it is merely one of many factors for the 
Court’s consideration as it develops a standard that provides certainty, 
clarity, and flexibility to process patentability. In the wake of Bilski, many 
scholars have stepped forward to propose alternatives to the “machine-or-
transformation” test. A few of these alternatives will be addressed briefly, 
and their implications considered. 
One approach that has been proposed involves modeling the current 
U.S. patent system on the more restrictive European system.170 The 
European Patent Office (EPO) requires patents to claim only those 
inventions that make a technical contribution.171 This requirement was 
added with the intention of focusing patent law towards those inventions 
which are intuitively seen as technical in nature172 and it is supplemented 
with a series of expressly excluded categories of subject matter:  
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(a) mere discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical models, 
(b) aesthetic creations, (c) schemes, rules and methods for 
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business and 
programs for computers, (d) presentation of information, (e) 
methods of treatment of the human or animal body, and (f) plant or 
animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals.173 
The addition of a technology requirement, however, has not proved to 
be a perfect solution, and has not provided a clear definition of patentable 
subject matter or prevented the issuance of patents that exceed its traditional 
boundaries, however they are defined.174 In fact, the requirement “has led to 
complicated rules and legal uncertainty” and simply provides a restatement 
of the struggle between age-old principles and the influx of new, and yet 
undefined, inventions.175 Such a rule provides little guidance to the 
patentability of process claims; as has been shown in Europe, without a 
legal definition of a “technical contribution,” the determination of 
patentable subject matter remains unclear. 
Taken whole cloth, the European method of analyzing patentability 
spells the death of medical diagnostic claims as they are currently known. 
Additional subject matter exclusions, such as the methods of treatment 
exclusions described above, could likely result in a return of “the magic 
words” doctrine. To avoid the pitfalls of the excluded subject matter, claim 
drafters would be required to characterize their inventions as including 
technical contributions or draft their claims to maintain the appearance of 
claiming something other than the prohibited invention. Since the European 
modifications to patentable subject matter exclude diagnostic and method of 
treatment claims and have not provided much-needed clarity, other methods 
of analysis should be explored by the Court. 
Michael Risch proposes a different approach in his article, Everything is 
Patentable.176 He argues that the Supreme Court should implement a single 
rule: 
[A]ny invention that satisfies the Patent Act’s requirements of 
category, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and specification is 
patentable. In other words, if a discovery otherwise meets the 
requirements of patentability, then the discovery will be properly 
patentable without need to consider non-statutory subject matter 
restrictions such as the bars against mathematical algorithms, 
products of nature, or natural phenomena.177 
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His rule finds its support in the language of the statute178 and ignores 
the inconsistencies of current patentable subject matter jurisprudence, 
which, he argues, “if extended to logical conclusions, would bar 
patentability of almost any invention or discovery, which certainly would 
present a suboptimal outcome.”179 Implementing a threshold standard for 
statutory subject matter, with the only requirement that an invention meet 
the boundaries of a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” would 
alleviate much of the controversy and inconsistent interpretation of this 
gatekeeper section.180  
Risch argues that any question regarding the patentability of new 
technologies “should be answered by the general criteria that Congress has 
established—criteria that have worked for over 150 years—to determine 
whether a particular patent claim should be allowed.”181 He believes that 
such a change would allow the Patent and Trademark Office and the courts 
to better focus their energies on “how best to apply rigorous standards of 
novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and specification with a scalpel rather than 
simply eliminating broad swaths of innovation with a machete.”182 There is 
something to be said for a system that allows a patent to speak for itself on 
its own merits—through a meeting of the requirements of novelty, 
nonobviousness, written description, and enablement—rather than simply 
barring its entrance at the door.183 The downside of this approach is the 
Constitutional implications it may have. The Constitution requires an 
invention to secure a patent.184 Without a standard for determining whether 
or not the subject matter itself is patentable, the original and basic 
regulations of the U.S. patent system are not met. 
Medical diagnostic claims, and biotechnology as a whole, could benefit 
from Risch’s broad rule. Creating a low bar to patentable subject matter 
allows the decision of whether or not to grant a particular patent to be based 
on the merits of the invention rather than its compliance with a rigid test. 
The low threshold afforded § 101 does not render the section meaningless, 
but instead gives it the breadth envisioned by Congress and places the 
burden of patentability on those sections that function to evaluate a patent 
for more than its objective subject matter. 
One final approach to consider is the implementation of flexible legal 
standards, or “policy levers”, proposed by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley.185 
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This approach proposes recognition and increased implementation of 
flexible legal standards, most of which are already operating in patent law, 
to take account of the varied types of innovations present in the different 
industries operating under the monolith of U.S. Patent Law.186 Some “levers 
operate at an industry-wide or ‘macro’ level, treating different industries 
differently as a whole . . . [while others] work at a case-by-case ‘micro’ 
level, treating some kinds of inventions differently than others without 
explicit regard to industry, but in a way that has disproportionate effects on 
certain industries.”187 The strength of their proposal comes from its inherent 
flexible application to a wide variety of industries and technologies. Unlike 
the inflexible, bright-line rules favored by the Federal Circuit (of which the 
“machine-or-transformation” test is a perfect example), legal standards are, 
by their very nature, “case-by-case decisional criteria that can take 
situational variance into account.”188 The indeterminate nature of this 
approach is likely to create uncertainty, especially when compared to a 
bright-line rule. Although the authors argue that standards provide the court 
with the ability to balance the interests of a particular industry with its 
effect on the public in a consistent and specific manner,189 they do not 
address the issue of technologies that cross technological boundaries or the 
uncertainty in areas where standards have not yet been established. The 
effects on the stability of the patent system and its implications on 
upcoming technologies are unclear. 
Unlike the rigid test in Bilski, however, a move towards the application 
of industry specific standards of patentability would prevent the inherent 
problems and inconsistencies exemplified by the decisions in Classen and 
Prometheus. Such an approach would take the analysis of § 101 back to its 
initial broad standard, but would elevate the analysis to encompass and 
control the varied technologies it covers. Medical diagnostic claims would 
benefit from such a system as it offers the Court and Congress the ability to 
tailor standards to address, for example, the diverging public policy 
interests of the biotech industry and the public as a whole. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In a single action, the Federal Circuit overturned more than a decade of 
relative stability in rejecting the State Street “useful, concrete and tangible 
result” standard in favor of a new “machine-or-transformation” test. As 
illustrated by the decisions in Classen and Prometheus, the rigid Bilski 
standard poses a significant threat of inconsistent application and 
uncertainty. Accordingly, the Supreme Court must articulate a new 
 
 186. Id. at 1576–79. 
 187. Id. at 1579. 
 188. Id. at 1639. 
 189. Id. 
100325 Follett Ready for Proofs (Schmall) 10/2/2011  8:12 PM 
258 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  7:1 
standard, or, at the very least, return to the status quo of State Street, 
restoring 35 U.S.C. § 101 to a broad utility standard that is consistent with 
public policy, precedent, and the statute’s original legislative design. 
 
